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Introduction
The concept of basic structure has been at the heart of numerous criti-
cisms of global justice.1 Theorists reluctant to accept the prospect for 
global redistribution have often based their arguments on the qualita-
tive difference between relations mediated by national institutions and 
relations mediated by global institutions. Depending on their opera-
tionalization of the basic structure, they claimed that at the global level 
we do not have high enough levels of coercion (Blake 2001, Nagel 2005, 
Risse 2005) or cooperation (Sangiovanni 2007,2 Klosko 2009) perceived 
as necessary conditions for triggering considerations of justice. Thus, 
they arrive at the conclusion that there is an important distinction to 
be made between full-fl edged societal justice and the more ambiguous 
“global justice”, undeserving of the name, and which should require ei-
ther different, less demanding principles of justice (Rawls 1999, Miller 
2007: 79), or be understood in terms of humanitarian duties (Nagel 
2005). Albeit value skepticism has ceased to be a respectable option, 
skepticism about global justice continues to pervade modern political 
philosophy.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: 1) to argue that whether a 
global basic structure exists is irrelevant from the standpoint of jus-
tice and 2) to set the stage for a cosmopolitan theory of global justice 
that employs satisfi cing suffi cientarianism as its distributive principle 
(the “satisfi cing” component refers to what I consider to be two possible 
justifi cations of suffi cientarianism: that it is rational for individuals 
to seek outcomes less than optimal and that moral imperatives do not 
require one to do more than “enough”3). Although the main focus of the 
paper is on the fi rst subject, I regard the second as one of its logical 
consequences and as an embodiment of what can be achieved in the do-
main of global justice once the incredulousness-goggles are abandoned. 
1 Although the two concepts are analytically distinct, whenever I refer to global 
justice in this paper I mean cosmopolitan global justice. Cosmopolitanism is based 
on the idea that each human being has equal moral worth, and that we have certain 
responsibilities towards all human beings qua human beings (Brock and Brighouse 
2005: 3–4). I will mostly refer to those who oppose the idea that there are global 
duties of justice as “anticosmopolitans.”
2 Sangiovanni begins from coercion-based statism but proceeds towards a 
reciprocity-based statism. He maintains from coercion-based statism the idea that 
to share participation in reproducing the state coercive system puts us in special 
relations, which is unlike any other relation we have with individuals beyond our 
borders and the idea that coercion, private law and taxations are important in 
limiting egalitarian justice demands to the state. However, he states explicitly that 
coercion plays only an instrumental role in his reciprocity-based internationalism 
(Sangiovanni 2007: 18).
3 Although the problem of how to understand this “enough” cannot be tackled in 
this paper, I believe that it should be an objective assessment at the very least. As 
it will be seen in Section IV, I actually propose 2 thresholds, which on the one hand 
can increase the degree of indeterminacy but on the other can better respond to the 
diverse circumstances encountered in real life.
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The sketch of a suffi cientarian theory of global justice that I present in 
the 4th section is also a way of responding to an important criticism 
that can be raised against my proposal of holding both individuals and 
institutions responsible for realizing principles of justice.
I start from the premise that there are three plausible scenarios 
regarding the concept of a global basic structure, which will be dully 
called A, B and C: that it already exists (A), that it is absent but it is 
achievable (B), and that a global basic structure could never be en-
forced (C).4 In the fi rst section I present fi ve competing operationaliza-
tions of the basic structure (the framing, coercion, pervasive impact, 
cooperation and controlling infl uence views). I show how accepting any 
one of these leads to considerations of global justice (under scenarios 
A and B). In the second section I mainly deal with scenario B, argu-
ing that taking the status quo as normatively demanding would be 
self-defeating for a theory of justice.5 This claim can be accommodated 
within a Rawlsian framework, which specifi es a natural duty to estab-
lish just institutions where these are absent (Rawls 1971: 334).6 The 
third section introduces the problematic scenario C. I argue that the 
concept of basic structure does not exhaust the realm of justice. Going 
further than the narrow Rawlsian understanding on institutions that 
belong to the basic structure, I hold that for a theory of justice indi-
vidual conduct outside those institutions should matter too. The moral 
principles that we choose should not be dependent on the existence of a 
basic structure. The institutional-interactional cut7 in the recent litera-
ture should thus be transcended. I advance a hybrid approach between 
interactional and institutional conceptions of justice. That is, the site 
of distributive justice8 should be extended to incorporate both the ef-
fi ciency of discharging one’s duties through a just institutional scheme 
and the moral value of promoting a good state of affairs through one’s 
own efforts. Institutional crafting should be done following two distinct 
desiderata: 1) fulfi lling the ends of our preferred theory of justice; 2) 
allowing individuals to pursue their own reasonable conception of the 
good within that institutional framework. To achieve such a synthesis, 
I must show that the latter desideratum can be endorsed by reasonable 
4 The third scenario also caters to the arguments of those rejecting the 
epistemological value of this concept altogether.
5 However, see James (2005).
6 Chor-Tan (2004) and Gilabert (2007) have pursued this strategy. James (2005: 
293), rejects this interpretation of the natural duty. According to James, this duty “is 
clearly meant to guide conduct with respect to existing practices.”
7 For the distinction see Pogge (1992: 50–1).
8 The site of justice denotes here where the principles of justice ought to apply. 
Rawls holds that they apply to the basic structure of a society, interactional/moral 
cosmopolitans that these apply to individuals, Cohen that they apply to “the patterns 
of benefi ts and burdens in a society” (Cohen 1997: 12). The scope of justice, on the 
other hand, refers to the “constituency” of those principles—do they apply to a single 
society, or globally?
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individuals9 and also that it does not embody unrealistic expectations 
from real people. One of the implicit objectives in this section is to show 
that the necessity of global justice is not dependent on a particular view 
on the site of justice, and that even if we reject the validity of the idea 
of a basic structure we hold duties of justice that extend to all other 
individuals.
This aspect will be argued for in the fourth section, where I am 
concerned with showing that, in order to avoid the trap of imposing 
supererogatoriness, the selected principles of justice ought to be suf-
fi cientarian. This is also where the differentia specifi ca from similar 
accounts such as Murphy’s (1998) lies: the overdemandingness of pur-
suing egalitarianism as a “supergoal” (Pogge 2000: 161) precludes the 
pursuit of personal goals and is thus probably unstable on the long 
term.10 Global satisfi cing suffi cientarianism avoids this problem,whilst 
accommodating the necessity of extending the site alongside the scope 
of justice.
1. On the ambiguity of the basic structure argument
What kind of duties do we bear towards other individuals? What 
grounds these duties and how weighty are them? Are our duties nega-
tive, or positive, and how far do they extend? Placing on the table some 
of the offers on the menu suffi ces to show that a minimal consensus on 
the matter is yet to be found. Pogge (2005: 42) argues that, by “uphold-
ing a shared institutional order that is unjust” we “foreseeably and 
avoidably reproduce radical inequality” and thus we are violating the 
negative duty not to impose harm on others. Stemplowska (2009) ar-
gues that our positive duties extend towards everyone, whereas Val-
9 I borrow the concept of reasonableness from Rawls. He argues that “persons are 
reasonable when, among equals, they are ready to propose principles and standards 
as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance 
that others will likewise do so” (Rawls 2005 [1993]: 49). Reasonable persons also 
accept the “burdens of judgment”, i.e. the fact that other people can develop distinct 
conceptions of the good and can endorse different comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 
2005: 61). The burdens of judgment act as a fundamental source for what Rawls 
calls reasonable pluralism. The two are perceived by Rawls as inextricably linked—
“since we cannot eliminate these burdens, pluralism is a permanent feature of a 
free democratic culture” (Rawls 2001: 36). Of course, pluralism refers here to the 
diversity of comprehensive doctrines prevailing in a modern society, a feature which 
is, according to Rawls, to be cherished (Rawls 2001: 37).
10 It is perhaps important to note that I partially side here with Rawls’ concern 
with the stability of a well-ordered society. One of the arguments from his Theory of 
justice for the two principles of justice as fairness is their capacity to stimulate the 
development of the sense of justice of citizens: “When the basic structure of society is 
publicly known to satisfy its principles for an extended period of time, those subject 
to these arrangements tend to develop a desire to act in accordance with these 
principles and to do their part in institutions which exemplify them” (Rawls 1971: 
177). G.A. Cohen (1991), who rejects altogether the compromise of ideal theory by 
looking at incentives, holds the opposite position.
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entini (2015) claims that we have to be Samaritans only towards the 
members of our state.11 For Valentini, we are bound by duties of justice 
towards the needy in virtue of their claim to a sphere of sovereignty 
that would be imperiled but for our intervention. Hers is an argument 
that sees the emergence of the duties of samaritanism in our position-
ing both as “a member of society with entitlements against the state, 
and as a member of the state with obligations to act on its behalf” 
(2015: 741). Goodin (1988) argues that, at the level of ideal theory, we 
would be entitled to treat our “fellow countrymen” with partiality. He 
rejects the existence of so-called special duties, holding that there are 
only duties that ought to be discharged following a model of “assigned 
responsibility.” At the level of non-ideal theory, nevertheless, states 
cannot claim that they are fulfi lling their general duty when they give 
priority to their citizens.
It would be diffi cult to track down all arguments for or against the 
idea of positive duties towards compatriots or towards everyone. In or-
der to narrow the discussion, I will focus in this article on criticizing 
those arguments that relate to the idea of a basic structure. As such, 
the theories presented below belong to the family of relational concep-
tions of justice, according to which the “practice-mediated relations in 
which individuals stand condition the content, scope and justifi cation 
of those principles and that social and political institutions funda-
mentally alter the relations in which individual stand, and hence the 
principles of distributive justice that are appropriate to them” (San-
giovanni 2009: 5). We should not consider, however, that all relational 
conceptions employ the basic structure argument. George Klosko, for 
instance, presents a public goods arguments for what he calls “com-
patriot preferences.” He argues that, in exchange for our obedience to 
the state’s laws, the state provides benefi ts in the form of public goods. 
Nothing comparable exists in the interstate realm. This is why there is 
moral precedence in the relations between citizens of the same country 
(Klosko 2009: 244–5). For methodological clarity, I stick in the present 
paper to those relational views that also employ the basic structure 
argument.
All the operationalizations of the idea of basic structure that are 
mentioned here have textual justifi cation in Rawls’ own writings. Nev-
ertheless, the reader should keep in mind that these are all particular 
applications, which at times depart drastically from the Rawlsian scaf-
folding and which sometimes make abstraction of the larger framework 
within which the concept of basic structure is embedded.12 As Abiza-
11 Valentini (2015) argues that we are bound by justice-based duties towards our 
compatriots and by benefi cence-based duties towards everyone, with the qualifi cation 
that her view of social samaritanism holds the “social” to be “a contingent matter […] 
in an increasingly globalized world, justice-based help may have to extend beyond 
national borders.”
12 See Rawls (2001: 25): “We start with the organizing idea of society as a fair 
system of cooperation and then make it more determinate by spelling out what 
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deh argued, Rawls himself mainly adopted an anticosmopolitan stance 
for methodological reasons in Theory of Justice and Justice as fairness 
(Abizadeh 2007: 359).13 On the other hand, Rawls emphasizes that one 
of the reasons for which we need not have a global difference principle14 
is that we have to generalize the idea of public reason and tolerate 
decent hierarchical societies as long as their basic structures respect a 
(minimal) core of requirements (Rawls 1999: 45, 58–9). By focusing on 
the basic structure of each society, critics argue, “Rawls has overlooked 
a fundamental dimension of the equality of peoples by ignoring the fact 
that the global basic structure can undermine the equality of peoples 
unless it is regulated by principles of distributive justice” (Buchanan 
2000: 709). Thus, we have mixed evidence regarding the weight of the 
basic structure argument in John Rawls’ own anticosmopolitanism. 
This is one of the reasons why I will present Rawls’ case for seeing the 
basic structure as the primary site of justice and afterwards I will dis-
cuss how the basic structure argument has been employed by anticos-
mopolitans in its various operationalizations. This section responds to 
the fi rst strategy of argumentation for global justice—by showing that, 
in the scenario where a global basic structure exists, we ought to apply 
the same principles we would apply at the level of a single state. That 
is, the positive duties we hold towards other individuals are duties of 
justice proper, not of benefi cence.
For Rawls, the basic structure is formed of those institutions which 
distribute primary goods, determining the division of advantages stem-
ming from social cooperation (Rawls 1971: 7). In the early conceptu-
alization of the basic structure, an institution was considered part of 
it if it secured “just background conditions against which the actions 
of individuals and associations take place” (Rawls 1977: 160), ensur-
ing what Rawls later calls the background justice (Rawls 2001: 10). 
Although the principles of justice should not apply directly to small-
scale situations, Rawls holds that a just basic structure “constrains, 
but does not uniquely determine, the suitable principles of local jus-
tice.” Rawls avoids offering a clear-cut defi nition of the basic structure, 
results when this idea is fully realized (the well-ordered society) and what this idea 
applies to (the basic structure). We then say how the fair terms of cooperation are 
specifi ed and explain how the persons engaged in cooperation are to be regarded (as 
free and equal)”, and the argumentation that follows.
13 See Rawls (2001: 40): “a political relationship is one of persons within the basic 
structure of society as a structure we enter only by birth and exit only by death (or 
so we may assume for the moment). Political society is closed, as it were. We do not, 
and indeed cannot, enter or leave it voluntarily” (my emphasis). Nevertheless, in a 
brief discussion on the purposes of political philosophy, Rawls seems to go further 
than in this pragmatic defense of anticosmopolitanism. According to him, one of the 
roles of justice as fairness is to contribute to how peoples think of their political and 
social institutions as a whole, and their basic aims and purposes as a society with a 
history” (2001: 2).
14 A position which has been previously endorsed by Rawlsians such as Pogge 
(1989) and Beitz (1979).
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arguing that “were we to lay a defi nition of the basic structure that 
draws sharp boundaries, not only would we go beyond what that rough 
idea could reasonably contain but we would also risk wrongly prejudg-
ing what more specifi c or future conditions may call for, thus making 
justice as fairness unable to adjust to different social circumstances” 
(Rawls 2001: 11).15
According to Rawls, there are in fact two roles played by the basic 
structure, corresponding to the two principles of justice as fairness: “in 
one role the basic structure specifi es and secures citizens’ equal basic 
liberties and establishes a just constitutional regime. In the other it 
provides the background institutions of social and economic justice in 
the form most appropriate to citizens seen as free and equal” (Rawls 
2001: 49). Furthermore, Rawls notes that there are two reasons why 
the basic structure should be considered the subject of justice. The fi rst 
line of argumentation is related to the necessity of ensuring background 
justice, which was mentioned above. A “division of labor” occurs, the 
endpoint being a situation where individuals “are left free to advance 
their permissible ends within the framework of the basic structure”; 
had it not been for a just basic structure, contingencies would have af-
fected the distribution of burdens and benefi ts in society. With a just 
basic structure, on the other hand, whatever state of affairs is reached 
is considered by all individuals just: “taking the basic structure enables 
us to regard distributive justice as a case of pure background proce-
dural justice: when everyone follows the publicly recognized rules of 
cooperation, the particular distribution that results is acceptable as 
just” (Rawls 2001: 54). The second reason for the basic structure is that 
it exerts “profound and pervasive infl uence on the persons who live un-
der its institutions” (Rawls 2001: 55). Furthermore, the basic structure 
also has as an important purpose the education of citizens “to a concep-
tion of themselves as free and equal” (Rawls 2001: 56).
As mentioned, the arguments for the basic structure put forward 
by Rawls have to be distinguished from the basic structure argument 
against global justice, which holds that in the absence of a global basic 
structure there can be no obligations of justice towards foreigners. The 
case for global justice would be strengthened if it could be shown that 
irrespective of the interpretation of the basic structure, the present 
interdependence between citizens of distant countries triggers consid-
erations of justice (I am not concerned with the attractiveness of each 
operationalization of the basic structure, only with whether or not they 
lead to global duties of justice).
15 There are two possible readings of this claim. One would follow James’ 
interpretation of Rawls as “reasoning from existing practices all along” (2005: 284). 
The second, which seems to be adopted by Miriam Ronzoni is that the ever-changing 
social conditions would ineluctably lead to a reevaluation of what institutions belong 
to the basic structure. See Ronzoni (2009).
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a) The coercion view.16 This interpretation of the basic structure 
holds that the site of justice consists of those institutions that sub-
ject persons to autonomy-violating coercion, in Blake’s version (Blake 
2001: 272), or those institutions that “make demands on the will of 
their members […] bringing with them exceptional obligations, the 
positive obligations of justice”, in Nagel’s version (Nagel 2005: 130). 
According to Blake, distributive justice is limited to the basic structure 
of a society because only its constitutive institutions “stand in need 
of justifi cation through the use of public reason.” For him, subjecting 
co-nationals to more stringent duties does not refl ect unequal concern 
towards one subset of people. The justifi cation for distributive justice 
at a narrower scope is that the national institutions are qualitatively 
different, and as such deserve to be justifi ed: “to the insiders, the state 
says: yes, we coerce you, but we do so in accordance with principles 
you could not reasonably reject. To outsiders, it says: we do not coerce 
you, and therefore do not apply our principles of liberal justice to you” 
(Blake 2001: 287). Nagel takes into account not only one’s subjection to 
coercive institutions, but also the fact that members of society play a 
Janus-like role, being both the society’s subjects and the ones in whose 
name its authority is exercised. According to him, our participation in 
a coercive collective enterprise entails a certain “involvement of agency 
or will that is inseparable from membership in a political society” (Na-
gel 2005: 128). As Cohen and Sabel put it, Nagel accepts both weak 
statism and strong statism. Weak statism holds that the existence of a 
state is both a necessary and a suffi cient condition for the emergence of 
egalitarian considerations. Strong statism entails that the existence of 
a state is both necessary and suffi cient for triggering any norms beyond 
humanitarianism’s moral minimum (J. Cohen and Sabel 2006). Cohen 
and Sabel compellingly argue that the normative discontinuity thesis 
endorsed by Nagel does not take into account the current conditions of 
global politics: economic integration is more intense than it ever used 
to; supranational institutions begin to have a considerable impact in 
fi elds as diverse as labor standards, environment, rights, food safety 
standards; the rules made in such structures have a great impact on 
individuals’ conduct and welfare; there is an increasing transnational 
politics of movements and organizations; even when supranational in-
stitutions lack coercive powers, they still have the ability to distrib-
ute incentives and to impose sanctions. The fact that nowadays even 
the least integrated country is a member of fourteen organizations is 
a compulsory proof that the conditions of interdependence and coop-
eration that have justice-generating implications obtain globally (J. 
Cohen and Sabel 2006: 166). Abizadeh shows that, on the one hand, 
16 Although the case for a coercion-based interpretation of the basic structure 
is the weakest of all 5, some textual evidence can be found in Rawls. For instance, 
he specifi es that “justice as fairness is a relationship of persons within the basic 
structure of society…political power being always coercive power, in a constitutional 
regime it is at the same time the power of free and equal citizens” (Rawls 2001: 40).
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Blake’s account is morally unappealing: Blake’s government would tell 
to members of other states: “we not only coerce you, but we coerce you 
without subjecting our ongoing coercion to the constraints of a legal 
system and the rule of law, and therefore we have no responsibilities 
of distributive justice to you” (Abizadeh 2007: 355). Furthermore, the 
empirical premise on which Blake’s argument rests, that there is no 
international coercive legal system, is invalid (Abizadeh 2007: 356). 
Even if we bite the bullet and accept this fl awed operationalization of 
the basic structure, the coercion view properly interpreted would still 
not show that a global basic structure does not exist.
b) The cooperation view originates in Rawls’ interpretation of soci-
ety as a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (Rawls 1971: 84). 
Sangiovanni acknowledges that, ultimately, human beings are the unit 
of moral concern, but argues that the same distributive principle can-
not apply indiscriminately. The onerous demands imposed by duties of 
egalitarian justice arise only among citizens of the same state, since the 
states provide us with most of the goods “necessary for developing and 
acting on a plan of life” (Sangiovanni 2007: 3–4). The view he upholds, 
reciprocity-based internationalism, perceives equality as a “relational 
ideal of reciprocity.” At the heart of his argument lies the moral rel-
evance of the aforementioned ability of being able to develop and act 
on a plan of life. Since this ability is conditioned by the contributions 
of our fellow citizens and residents in the state, to them we owe obliga-
tions of egalitarian reciprocity (Sangiovanni 2007: 19–20). Albeit the 
place of one’s birth is morally arbitrary, what grounds justice is the 
idea of reciprocity: “others are owed a fair return of what they have 
given you, just as you are owed a fair return for what you have given 
others.” The fact that citizens of a state are subject to the same laws 
and social rules that enable them to “sustain their lives as citizens, pro-
ducers and biological beings are owed a fair return for what those who 
have benefi ted from their submission have received” (Sangiovanni 2007: 
26).17 For Sangiovanni, the brute luck-option luck distinction18 is valid 
only under certain circumstances: “the special presumption against in-
equalities [arising from brute luck] only applies among those who share 
in the maintenance and reproduction of the state” (Sangiovanni 2007: 
29). How does Sangiovanni respond to the most signifi cant objection ad-
dressed to Rawls’ conceptualization of society as a venture for mutual 
advantage, that it neglects those who are not able-bodied and thus are 
not contributing parts of society (Young 2006: 95)? He addresses this 
objection, but gives what would defi nitely be perceived by feminists as 
an inadequate response—“they do not have claims deriving from a con-
ception of distributive equality. This does not mean that they have no 
17 Interesting enough, the three hypostases of the human being he envisions 
correspond to the Arendtian distinction between labor, work and action (Arendt 
1958).
18 For the distinction, see Dworkin 2002: 73.
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claims in justice. They have claims which derive from their equal moral 
worth and dignity as human beings” (2007: 31).
Although the cooperation view seems to lead to some counterintui-
tive implications, such as disregarding the claims of the disabled, I will 
leave aside this issue and proceed at showing how a case for global 
justice can be built on the basis of this operationalization of the basic 
structure. Take the case of Beitz, who is usually considered to hold a 
cooperation view of the basic structure.19 He argues that levels so high 
of interaction characterize today’s world order that global redistribu-
tive claims are required. On the other hand, in a scenario where two 
previously self-suffi cient societies would begin exchanging apples and 
pears, this commercial act would not trigger considerations of justice 
(Beitz 1979: 65–6). Where to situate the threshold over which justice 
applies? How to determine whether the levels of interaction are suffi -
ciently high?20 Is cooperation really a necessary and suffi cient condition 
for duties of justice to arise? Or is it just an instrumental condition? 
One way of settling the matter would be by employing the conceptual 
instruments provided by relational equality. According to Anderson 
(1999: 312), the ideal of equality should be embodied in relational egal-
itarianism, which considers that equality should characterize a type 
of social relations between people, instead of being a distribution of 
non-relational goods. Equality entails not a distributive pattern, but 
refl ects the idea that all people are equally moral agents, everyone hav-
ing the power to develop and exercise moral responsibility, to cooperate 
with others according to some principles of justice, to shape and fulfi ll 
a conception of their good. If one adopts such a stance regarding equal-
ity, one can see why a global basic structure exists. How we perceive 
ourselves depends not only on how our relations with conationals look 
like, but how we are perceived by others and how we fare in interac-
tions with foreigners. A permanent position as an outsider cannot but 
have pernicious effects on one’s well-being. Proponents of the capability 
approach have long argued that the social norms can infl uence how one 
19 For instance, this claim is held by Abizadeh (2007). I am not sure if Beitz 
would agree with this characterization, since he explicitly mentions that cooperation 
in a social and economic scheme does not suffi ce to trigger distributive principles of 
justice and that pervasive impact and coercion are better harbingers that there are 
distributive requirements (Beitz 1979: 166).
20 Arash Abizadeh considers that the cooperation theory shows that a global basic 
structure does not exist, but that its rationale for holding the basic structure as the 
site of justice represents a plea for ensuring that the “existence condition of justice, 
social interaction, obtains at the global level as well” (2007: 327–340). He claims 
that under the cooperation view, one ought to recognize that “a basic structure is not 
an existence condition of justice, but an instrumental condition of justice” and that 
cosmopolitans have the more limited task of showing that a global basic structure 
would be feasible (Abizadeh 2007: 339). Thus, the problem is relegated to one at the 
second stage of non-ideal theory, where such agency shortcomings and feasibility 
issues are dealt with (Ypi 2010).
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converts distribuenda into capabilities (Robeyns 2000).21 Thus, adopt-
ing a more nuanced cooperation view of the basic structure entails that 
its scope is global.22
c) The pervasive impact view. Roughly, under the pervasive impact 
view the institutions that belong to the basic structure are those with 
a pervasive impact on persons’ life chances. This approach also fi nds 
textual support in Rawls’ Theory of Justice, where he notes that the 
basic structure is taken as the site of justice because “its effects are so 
profound and present from the start” (Rawls 1971: 7). According to Abi-
zadeh, the standard anticosmopolitan basic structure argument takes 
the following form under this interpretation: 
P1: The scope of justice consists of those persons whose life chances 
  are pervasively impacted by a society’s basic structure.
P2: The range of persons whose lives are pervasively impacted by 
  any given existing basic structure is not global in scope.
C: The scope of justice is not global (Abizadeh 2007: 343–4).
According to Abizadeh, and to other writers as well, the second premise 
is weak.23 There are numerous international organizations that exert 
pervasive infl uence, such as the International Monetary Fund or the 
World Trade Organization. The purported case against global justice 
based on interpreting the basic structure in terms of institutions that 
impact people’s lives is the weakest and as such I will not discuss it 
any further.
d) The controlling infl uence view. To my knowledge, this operation-
alization of the basic structure has only been endorsed by Hodgson 
(2012), who noticed that pervasive infl uence and coercion represent 
inadequate criteria for specifying what institutions should be consid-
ered as part of the basic structure. He identifi es being subject to the 
rules associated with a basic structure with “being born in the middle 
of a game that one has no choice about playing.” As such, the basic 
structure ought to be just, since it exerts an infl uence that determines 
“how a person can exercise her capacity for a conception of the good”, 
specifying “the rules and constraints through which a person has no 
reasonable choice but to proceed if she is to adopt and pursue a concep-
tion of the good” (Hodgson 2012: 314–5). According to Hodgson, the 
coercion view makes the illegitimate attempt to treat all institutions as 
if they were similar to the model of criminal law, whereas the control-
ling infl uence view “acknowledges coercion as an important concern, 
21 For the distinction between distribuenda and the metric/currency of justice, 
see Gheaus (2016).
22 There is another reason that I cannot explore here for advocating interpreting 
the cooperation view in relational egalitarian terms, i.e. its compatibility with 
suffi cientarianism.
23 Buchanan (2000: 705): “there is a global basic structure […] a set of economic 
and political institutions that has profound and enduring effects on the distribution 
of burdens and benefi ts among peoples and individuals around the world.”
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yet it also recognizes that controlling infl uence can be exerted in ways 
that are not coercive in a narrow sense but that nevertheless raise fun-
damental concerns from the point of view of a person’s ability to set 
and pursue ends” (Hodgson 2012: 326). Thus, an institution is part of 
the basic structure if it infl uences one’s ability to set and pursue ends. 
Hodgson argues that criticisms such as Cohen’s, regarding the impact 
of an egalitarian ethos on the life prospects of individuals, are accom-
modated within the controlling infl uence view: “if suffi ciently preva-
lent, such an ethos has the potential to infl uence the workings of the 
basic structure at the deepest level, effectively changing the rules and 
constraints” (Hodgson 2012: 329). However, his view is indeterminate 
in an important respect, which leaves room for considerations of global 
justice to arise—what is and what is not part of the basic structure is 
determined ex post facto, by looking at the alternatives that individuals 
have; nevertheless, what his theory needs is an independent account 
of what constitute reasonable alternatives (Hodgson 2012: 334). In an 
increasingly interdependent world, and in the context of a refugee cri-
sis, borders become part of the basic structure, and the border regime, 
which is a global institution, gains normative relevance. As such, Hod-
gon’s operationalization of the basic structure is easy to reconcile with 
global justice claims.
e) Framing. Julius (2006) accepts the legitimacy of Nagel’s idea that 
there are responsibilities that we incur although they do not originate in 
our will. What he doesn’t agree with, nonetheless, is Nagel’s disregard 
for the actual acceptance of the terms of cooperation. One has to have 
the real opportunity to exit the coercive system if she disagrees with 
the terms imposed on her, otherwise there can be no justifi cation for the 
coercion. Julius’ objections have to be placed in his wider account of the 
basic structure, which he has developed elsewhere (2003). For Julius, 
coercive institutions become instruments for infl uencing other people 
to serve their purposes. His conclusion is straightforward: one should 
not use other people to her benefi t unless the purpose towards which 
one aims is compatible to a certain degree with those other people’s ob-
jectives, or they have their own “reasons to want to come about” (2006: 
188). This leads to a criterion that has to be satisfi ed by the institutions 
comprising the basic structure: they have to be justifi able to every oth-
er person which the choosers of the basic structure frame (2003: 334). 
More specifi cally, his view of the basic structure holds that “relations of 
interactive interdependence create the problem of distributive justice 
because it is only by reason of her entanglement in those relations that 
a person is required to justify her shaping of others’ actions by appeal 
to a global distribution of goods” (2003: 344). Framing occurs especially 
at a transnational level, where citizens of rich countries benefi t from 
the plight of those from poor, underdeveloped countries, who provide 
cheap labor force and raw materials. As such, we are entitled to speak 
of a global basic structure, which comprises those institutions through 
which the advantaged frame the disadvantaged.
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We thus have 5 different operationalizations of the basic structure. 
All of them, if properly defi ned, can show that there is indeed a global 
basic structure. If that is the case, then even relational theorists should 
hold that there is a prima facie case for global justice. Nonetheless, I 
argue that we should go even further. In the next section, I intend to 
show that even if the anticosmopolitan were right and there were no 
global basic structure, this should not preclude obligations of justice to 
arise at the global scale.
2. Is there a duty to create just 
basic institutions at the global level?
Under scenario B), there is no global basic structure yet in place. For 
Rawlsians, this is the end of discussion. Global justice becomes a mere 
mirage. However, what should be more important is that individuals 
have the natural duty to establish the institutions that could provide 
the resources necessary in order to achieve the ends of global justice. 
Ignoring this natural duty would be to have an incomplete conception 
of right (Rawls 1971: 333). One important caveat: in this section I do 
not discuss yet the matter of extending the site of justice. The argu-
ments advanced for establishing a just basic structure even if this were 
not yet existent usually belong to the institutional family of cosmopoli-
tan theories.24
Kok Chor-Tan is adamantly against the idea that global justice 
can be achieved if we ignore the global institutional context within 
which countries interact. For him, if we stick with the humanitarian 
assistance view, we would treat only the symptoms of global poverty, 
leaving unchanged the structural causes. This is why we need better 
principles and institutions to regulate the growing interdependency, 
and “to distribute the burdens and benefi ts of globalization more equi-
tably” (Chor-Tan 2004: 28–32). For him, a propensity to misinterpret 
Rawls has been translated into using the notion of the basic structure 
in order to suppress global justice initiatives. But, if considerations of 
global justice apply, they must apply regardless of the existing global 
cooperative scheme. Constraining the applicability of justice to what-
ever social arrangements we currently happen to have would be an 
arbitrary bias towards the status quo. If others are vulnerable to our 
actions or our failures to act, then they fall within the scope of our 
concern, irrespective of whether there is an established institutional 
scheme through which to exert our duties (Chor-Tan 2004: 59). Tan 
affi rms that there is a Kantian dimension to this argument, since Kant 
has noted that considerations of justice come into play the moment our 
actions have infl uence on the other. Furthermore, “the degree of global 
24 Institutional views apply to institutional schemes, while interactional 
conceptions “postulate certain fundamental principles of ethics, fi rst-order principles 
in that they apply directly to the conduct of persons and groups” (Pogge 1992: 48–50). 
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interdependency is such that even if we were to accept that there are 
no signifi cant institutions that we are helping to impose on each other, 
domestic decisions regarding tax laws for businesses, consumption and 
the deployment of technologies that have environmental implications 
have potentially grave implications for others beyond the borders of 
the countries in which these decisions are made. The requirement of 
reciprocity would demand that such decisions be made only under con-
ditions in which it would be reasonable for outsiders to accept these 
decisions, even if there were no global institutions mediating the inter-
action of countries” (Chor-Tan 2004: 173).
What anticosmopolitans do not account for is the fact that “the dis-
crepancy between the density of coercion at the domestic and interna-
tional levels is not a natural fact about the world, but instead the re-
sult of distributive political confl ict” (Pevnik 2008: 404). Disregarding 
the natural duty to establish just institutions at the global level leads 
to the absence of a just background against which interactions among 
citizens of different states occur. Pevnik is right to emphasize the fact 
that confi ning duties of justice to the national state allows “one’s moral 
status to depend on one’s preinstitutional power” (Pevnik 2008: 406). 
Maintaining the status quo as morally relevant is problematic, since 
it amounts to what Popper (1947: 60) called “ethical positivism”, the 
inappropriate reduction of norms to facts.
Ypi (2010) remarks that the debates on global justice are vitiated by 
the fundamental fl aw of confusing ideal and non-ideal requirements. 
Although different contexts mean that the way principles are imple-
mented is different, this occurs at the level of non-ideal theory, which 
should follow, not ground, ideal theory considerations.25 Ypi acknowl-
edges that aspects such as coercion, reciprocity, cooperation matter, 
but they should be of interest only after principles of justice are speci-
fi ed (Ypi 2010: 542). In order for anticosmopolitans’ arguments to suc-
ceed, they should argue that “there are no circumstances of justice at 
the global level such that [distributive] principles could be required, or 
that no global relations could warrant a claim for global [distributive] 
justice” (Ypi 2010: 547).26 Although she shows the necessity of creat-
ing institutions that ensure global basic justice, Ronzoni errs in this 
way by starting the discussion from non-ideal theory. She claims that 
empirical studies might be needed in order to ascertain whether the 
25 A similar contention can be found in Miklos (2011) where he holds that 
institutions play a constitutive role in determining the content of principles of justice, 
i.e. better specify what principles require and how they look like when effectively 
pursued in non-ideal circumstances (although he does not discuss in terms of ideal/
non-ideal theory).
26 Ypi uses “egalitarian” instead of “distributive.” Most debates around global 
justice focus on the existence of egalitarian obligations of justice. Sangiovanni 
(2012) constitutes an exception in that he highlights that the distinction between 
“distributive obligations more demanding than humanitarianism” can also extend to 
suffi cientarian or prioritarian principles.
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global order raises problems regarding background justice (2009: 232). 
Though any practice-dependent account can be susceptible to commit-
ting this error, her view presents new arguments for establishing just 
global institutions. She criticizes the practice-dependent conceptions 
advanced so far, which erroneously “consider the existence of a basic 
structure as a necessary condition for some relevant obligations of so-
cioeconomic justice to apply.” Arguing for a better understanding of 
practice-dependence, she stresses the importance of background jus-
tice: “a practice-dependent account must also be concerned with social 
scenarios where full-blown socioeconomic practices with clearly identi-
fi able systems of rules are not in place but where their establishment 
is required in order to preserve thee justice of other existing practices” 
(Ronzoni 2009: 234). Although her conclusion is that there should not 
necessarily be a plain extension of social principles at the global level, 
she makes an important case for the establishment of global institu-
tions that ensure background justice. The views analyzed in the pre-
vious sections have disregarded this aspect, leading to some peculiar 
implications. For instance, the coercive view could not account for the 
fact that there could be non-coercive types of interaction between citi-
zens that lead to similar consequences as coercive interaction and as 
such require justifi cation (Pevnik 2008: 407) (such aspects can arise, 
inter alia, from externalities of state actions, or from some apparently 
consensual interactions which in fact are the result of the lack of exis-
tence of background justice).27 As Barry (1982: 234) argues, relying on 
the status quo for guiding our considerations of justice would lead to 
freezing even grotesque allocations of rights.
Thus, if we take the importance of background justice seriously, we 
ought to strive to establish a just basic structure, even where the actual 
levels of cooperation/framing/coercion/pervasive impact/controlling in-
fl uence are not as high in order to trigger in the present considerations 
of justice. This does not mean that our duties can be discharged only 
at an institutional level or that we have done our fair share if we con-
tributed to achieving a just basic structure. Institutions matter, but, as 
I will argue in the next section, so does individual conduct outside of 
the institutional realm. What matters are not institutions per se, but 
the realization of our principles of justice. We should try, as it were, to 
achieve what Sen calls comprehensive outcomes, which account for con-
sequences, as well as for the “signifi cance of social processes, including 
the exercise of duties and responsibilities” (Sen 2009: 22). The next sec-
tion is also of interest for those who reject the epistemic relevance of the 
concept of basic structure. By advocating an institutional-interactional 
account, I try to show that the existence of a global basic structure is 
in fact irrelevant from the standpoint of justice: scenario A has shown 
that all operationalizations of the basic structure lead to considerations 
27 The way the International Monetary Fund has treated the Asian fi nancial 
crisis of 1997–8 is a well-known example in this sense. See Stiglitz (2002).
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of justice; scenario B has argued that we have a natural duty to estab-
lish a global basic structure even if one is not in place for the moment; 
in the next section I try to show that realizing this natural duty is in 
fact a matter of effi ciency and that by themselves institution do not 
ground justice; they play only an instrumental role in discharging our 
duties. What matters is that, under circumstances where a global basic 
structure could not be established, or where institutions fail, our duties 
towards others remain intact. The next section thus argues for a hybrid 
version of cosmopolitan global justice, which transcends the arbitrary 
interactional-institutional cut. The fourth section will show that the 
duties mentioned throughout this paper belong to the family of suf-
fi cientarian duties of justice.
3. Revisiting the site of distributive justice
Throughout the previous sections, several functions of institutions 
have been mentioned or implied. Whether they exert a pervasive in-
fl uence or controlling infl uence on individuals, whether they act as a 
warranty for pure procedural justice, or if they coerce individuals and 
as such require justifi cation, institutions play an important role. But 
do they ground duties of justice? More importantly, do they exhaust the 
realm of justice?
Nussbaum holds that, although people are the ultimate bearers of 
moral duties, we have several reasons for which to uphold an institu-
tional fulfi llment of those duties. Collective action issues and the pos-
sibility that others might shirk from their duties lead her to argue for 
an institutional route to justice. This way, she argues, individuals are 
provided with “broad discretion about how to use their lives...Institu-
tions impose on all, in a fair way, the duty to support the capabilities 
of all, up to a minimum threshold. Beyond that, people are free to use 
their money, time and other resources as their own conception of the 
good dictates. Ethical norms internal to each religious or ethical com-
prehensive doctrine will determine how far each person is ethically re-
sponsible for doing more than what is institutionally required. But the 
political task of supporting the capabilities threshold itself is delegated 
to institutions” (Nussbaum 2005: 213).
I disagree. According to my conception of the nature of justice, in-
dividuals’ duties are not exhausted in institutions. Institutions, de-
spite their advantages,28 are contingent. Drawing from Ypi’s two-stage 
theorizing about justice, we could identify two prominent reasons why 
justice is not only about institutions. At the level of ideal theory, in-
dividuals have claims on one another prior to the existence of insti-
28 The advantages depend of course on how we defi ne institutions. Basically, the 
main advantages of institutions (which can be, caeteris paribus, be acknowledged 
by all major schools of neoinstitutionalism, i.e. sociological, constructivist, rational 
choice or historical), are that they reduce the transaction costs and uncertainty. On 
this, see North (1991).
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tutions, and these are not deemed irrelevant or magically disappear 
when institutional schemes are established. At the level of non-ideal 
theory, there will always be deviations of the institutions from what is 
required in order to fulfi ll the ends of our preferred principles of dis-
tributive justice. There will always be situations which elude the grasp 
of institutions.
Let me repurpose one well-known example invoked against (some) 
prioritarians (and (some) utilitarians), the tyranny of nonaggregation 
objection. This objection holds that a non-aggregative prioritarian 
would purportedly let Jones, who is trapped under an electrical equip-
ment in the transmitter room of the World Cup, suffer, as long as rescu-
ing him would bring no matter how trifl e disadvantages to a very high 
number of spectators (Tungodden and Fleuerbaey 2007: 2). Individuals 
are not to wait for some institution to come in and solve the problem. 
They have to act, and this is a duty of justice, which can be settled dif-
ferently according to various principles of justice.
Some, especially Rawlsians, would claim that this is not a matter 
of distributive justice, but of allocative justice (Rawls 1971: 88). Oth-
ers would hold that such an example falls under duties of rescue or 
benefi cence, but not under duties of justice. I do not deny the existence 
of these duties—I make the more limited claim that some apparent ex-
amples which purportedly trigger duties of rescue in fact should trigger 
considerations of justice. Suppose through public debate it is decided 
that suffi ciency is an appropriate moral ideal and that capabilities are 
selected as the appropriate currency of justice. Suppose further that 
an institutional framework is established which aims at ensuring that 
each individual reaches a threshold of capabilities. The system is work-
ing smoothly, and most of the previously disadvantaged individuals 
are brought above the suffi ciency threshold. Assume that Cassie is a 
highly successful businesswoman. She passes one day near Morland, 
who has recently lost his house.29 Coincidentally, both Cassie and Mor-
land suffer from a rare condition, which makes them forget at times 
important pieces of information. For instance, there exists an institu-
tion that offers temporary shelter to homeless persons, but neither of 
them recalls this particular information at the moment. If individu-
als did not have extra-institutional duties of justice, she could throw 
Morland some money and leave. However, if individuals have duties 
of justice, she ought to help him fi nd a shelter, or fi nance him until he 
gets a job. This is not merely a duty of charity (which would have been 
fulfi lled even if she had given him a small amount of money), but one 
of justice—ensuring that each individual reaches a relevant capabil-
ity threshold. I further argue that she should be indifferent towards 
Morland’s nationality. Of course, suffi ciency has as an advantage the 
fact that it is concerned with absolute deprivation, not with relative 
standings of individuals. Anticosmopolitans usually endorse suffi cien-
29 For simplicity, I won’t delve into the problem of responsibility here.
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tarian distributive justice at the global level, though they ask for more 
demanding distributive principles at the level of the nation state (San-
giovanni 2007). This might count as an independent reason for endors-
ing a suffi cientarian conception of global justice, though I won’t explore 
this strategy here.
One more plausible interpretation of the role of institutions in a 
theory of justice is that offered by Andras Miklos. According to him, 
institutions constitutively determine the principles of justice. Political 
institutions “fi ll out” the substance of a theory of justice “by translating 
abstract principles of justice into specifi c rights and obligations for in-
dividuals by way of law-making and policy-making” (Miklos 2011: 169). 
Take rules governing property, he says, and the rule of the lack of legit-
imacy of transfers of property made under duress. What duress means, 
nonetheless, has to be interpreted by institutions: “in abstraction from 
existing institutions, the rule cannot have suffi cient specifi city” and it 
would not be easily generalizable. This is one of those instances where 
individual actions cannot, in the context of social interaction, settle the 
matter. Institutions that determine the content of justice are neces-
sary here (Miklos 2011: 170).30 Furthermore, since there are numer-
ous ways that the outcomes suggested by a theory of justice could be 
obtained, it is up to political institutions to “determine a unique set of 
rules and provide assurance that they will be adhered to” (Miklos 2011: 
173). This means that institutions play a constitutive role in theories 
of justice, determining how the principles of justice are translated in 
non-ideal contexts, “making the otherwise indeterminate requirements 
of justice suffi ciently determinate by subjecting individual judgment to 
rules or directives” (Miklos 2011: 175).
It is important to note that Miklos’ view on institutions does not 
represent a criticism to my argument that there are extra-institutional 
duties of justice. He explicitly mentions that he makes the more limited 
claim that “principles of justice do not yield a suffi ciently determinate 
answer in the absence of working institutions” (Miklos 2011: 177). I 
agree, since this is a problem often encountered in non-ideal theory. 
His position is thus one that endorses neither statism nor cosmopoli-
tanism, but upholds the idea that the existing nation-states do not nec-
essarily limit the scope of justice. The global institutional scheme could 
be reformed “so as to become more sensitive to the demands of global 
justice” (Miklos 2011: 182). Miklos’ arguments fi nd strength when one 
30 He identifi es such an indeterminacy in Rawls’ theory when it comes to the 
rate of just savings, claiming that in the absence of regulations by institutions, there 
would be no possibility of knowing that rate or “meeting the requirements of justice 
prior to and independently of these institutions (171). Rawls holds only that “once 
the difference principle is accepted, it follows that the social minimum is to be set 
at that point which, taking wages into account, maximizes the expectations of the 
least advantaged group...each generation having to put aside in each period of time 
a suitable amount of real capital accumulation” (besides preserving its culture and 
ensuring the continuity of a just basic structure) (Rawls 1971: 285).
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takes a closer look at history. In the period of Reconstruction that fol-
lowed the end of the American Civil War the conservative Supreme 
Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment in such a way that a 
century had to pass that the Civil Rights Movement fi nish the actual 
Reconstruction. The Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873 distinguished be-
tween national and state citizenship, with the Court arguing that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected “only those rights that owed their 
existence to the federal government...The U.S. vs. Cruikshank decision 
of 1876 argued that the amendments following the Civil War required 
that only violations of the blacks by the states were to be condemned at 
the federal level. Individual violations were a matter of state authority 
concern. This allowed the Ku Klux Klan to continue its acts of terror: 
“in the name of federalism, the decision rendered national prosecution 
of crimes committed against blacks virtually impossible, and gave a 
green light to acts of terror where local offi cials either could not or 
would not enforce the law (Foner 2002). The way legal institutions ac-
tually interpret principles is thus important, and Miklos is right that 
in the non-ideal world this is going to play a signifi cant role in the way 
justice is really applied.
The shortcomings of institutions also show why we need to postu-
late individual positive duties. A similar case is made by Stemplows-
ka (2009), who argues that there are prima facie reasons to do what 
our positive duties require, sometimes at the expense of the negative 
duty not to support harmful institutions. Contrast this with Pogge’s 
narrower insistence that only membership in a common institutional 
scheme imposes negative duties not to participate in an unjust insti-
tutional order. A purist institutional view “pays too much attention to 
duty-bearers and not enough to entitlement bearers, to the needy, the 
hungry and the sick” (Caney 2005: 107–114), that is, those below a rel-
evant threshold. This fetishism of confi ning justice to an institutional 
framework can have counterintuitive effects (Murphy 1998: 274).
This emphasis on individual positive duties should not diverge at-
tention from the necessity of establishing just institutions, whenever 
it is possible (and whenever this does not violate other moral values). 
There is a reason why a great deal of cosmopolitan writings has been 
institutional. In a recent paper, Scheffl er (2014) presents several plau-
sible reasons why global justice ought to pay attention to institutions. 
One reason is “normative and conceptual”, stressing the fact that “jus-
tice is concerned with rights, power and the control of resources”, not 
with acts of “individual benefi cence.” There are instrumental reasons 
as well, the problems being too complex to be solved individually. The 
third reason he mentions is “diagnostic”, referring to the structural 
causes of global poverty, which require a “rewriting of fundamental 
terms of global political and economic interaction, a restructuring of 
the practices and institutions of the international order.”
However, this instrumental defense of institutional cosmopolitan-
ism should not make us ignore what truly matters—improving the 
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prospects of the worse off.31 The position that I defend here is that the 
site of distributive justice ought to be extended so as to refl ect both 
the effi ciency of discharging one’s duties through a just institutional 
scheme and the moral value of promoting a good state of affairs through 
one’s own efforts. Institutional crafting should thus be done following 
two distinct desiderata: 1) fulfi lling the ends of our preferred theory 
of justice; 2) allowing individuals to pursue their own reasonable con-
ception of the good within that institutional framework. As Murphy 
notes, there is not a clear-cut distinction between the domain of mo-
rality and normative political theory (1998: 253). The conception that 
he advocates, monism, holds that the same principles should regulate 
institutional and individual conduct. Of course, the point of departure, 
as it will be emphasized in the next section, is that his is an egalitar-
ian approach to justice, whereas I consider that the global distributive 
principles ought to be suffi cientarian. One important distinction that 
should be introduced here is that between perfect and imperfect duties. 
I hold that individuals’ obligations are imperfect, while institutional 
obligations can be easily specifi ed as perfect. For instance, if we remain 
silent when we can do something to help one not fall under a threshold 
(for instance, take a non-controversial right, like the right to physi-
cal integrity), we would transgress our imperfect obligation to provide 
reasonable help (Sen 2009: 374–5). This allows us to account for the 
circumstances in which our actions take place. Had the cost to our own 
safety been too high, for instance, we would not have been morally re-
quired to intervene.32 Does the distinction between perfect/imperfect 
duties reintroduce the interactional/institutional cut that I have been 
arguing against?33 No, because the nature of the duties remains the 
same, only the intensity with which different agents have to fulfi ll 
them differs. The same obligations befall on individuals as on institu-
tions, the only difference being that, when it comes to the former, one 
should also account for other values, such as the possibility of leading 
a life of one’s choice. Specifying individual duties as imperfect allows 
individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good, within limits. 
This latter point will prove to be important in the next section, 
where I focus on the problem of overdemandingness. Murphy writes 
that the dualist view on the nature of justice (that different principles 
apply to institutional and individual conduct) is well represented in 
literature mainly as a consequence of perceiving the monist view as too 
31 With the caveat that we should focus on comprehensive outcomes (as Sen 2009 
calls them).
32 Specifying individual duties as imperfect duties could soften criticisms such as 
Saladin Meckled-Garcia’s (2008: 256–7) who claims that “it is unclear what coherent 
principle, primary or secondary, describing perfect duties individual agents could 
follow that continuously adjusts for fairness in distributive consequences.” Under 
my conception, however, individual duties should only supplement, not replace, 
duties discharged through institutional action.
33 I thank Kimberly Hutchings for urging me to clarify this aspect.
 A. C. Dumitru, On the Moral Irrelevance of a Global Basic Structure 253
demanding: “the standard way of thinking about the problem of what 
are reasonable moral/political demands focuses on the cost or sacrifi ce 
imposed on complying agents. It is true that monistic nonideal theory, 
if it requires people to do as much as they can to promote equality or 
well-being seems to be extremely demanding—especially in a cosmo-
politan version (Murphy 1998: 289). I will argue that Murphy’s own 
view, however, is too demanding—this is why we need to advocate suf-
fi cientarian principles. In order to better link the domains of morality 
and normative political theory, I will also present a particular version 
of the suffi ciency view, satisfi cing suffi cientarianism.
4. Avoiding overdemandingness—towards a satisfi cing 
suffi cientarian theory of global cosmopolitan justice
Extending the site alongside the scope of justice exposes my project to 
the overdemandingness objection—do we ask too much from individu-
als if we posit both duties to uphold just institutions and to discharge 
their (imperfect) duties through personal actions? In order to show how 
this challenge can be met, I will argue in this section that the selected 
principles of justice ought to belong to the suffi cientarian family of dis-
tributive principles.
Some methodological clarifi cations are in order. I will follow Mur-
phy (2000: 12) in holding that a principle is too demanding when it 
limits the ability of an individual to live a life of her choice. This occurs 
at the second level of inquiry postulated by Lea Ypi, that of non-ideal 
theory. At this level, we have to “take seriously into account non-ideal 
agency, e.g. the coercive power of states or the associative conditions 
under which ideal principles of justice become feasible and agents are 
motivated to promote cosmopolitan initiatives” (Ypi 2010: 543). Allen 
Buchanan puts forward some plausible criteria for how the transition 
from ideal to non-ideal theory should be done. According to him, an ide-
al theory should be accessible, feasible and morally accessible. Feasi-
bility is understood here more narrowly, as compatibility with “human 
capacities generally.” Accessibility refers to “the existence of a practical 
route from where we are now to at least a reasonable approximation 
of the state of affairs that satisfi es the theory’s principles”, whereas 
moral accessibility could be linked to the idea of overdemandingness, 
in that it asks that there are is no unacceptable moral wrongdoing in 
the transition from our current states of affairs to the postulated ideal 
(Buchanan 2004: 61–2). I will focus here on moral accessibility, which I 
loosely interpret as a criterion whose fulfi llment would show that a set 
of principles do not impose unreasonable moral costs on an individual 
and thus are not overdemanding.34
34 The reader might ask why I associate reasonableness (which, as mentioned 
above, I take to have almost the same understanding as in Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism; a slight change is done below) and overdemandigness. Rawls mentions 
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Let me now track how this objection may arise and whether it can 
be met. In his criticism of Rawls’ lack of concern with the existence of 
an egalitarian ethos, Cohen mentions that his ideal society could be 
erroneously regarded as one in which “a person would have to worry 
about unfortunate people every time he made an economic decision”, a 
feature which would be appalling to liberals (Cohen 1991: 316).35 Any 
monist theory encounters this potential counterargument from liberal-
ism. Rawls, for instance, mentions that a plausible political conception 
of justice has as a feature its applicability to the basic structure. Fur-
thermore, one of the distinctions between a political conception and a 
comprehensive doctrine is that the latter “belongs to the background 
culture of civil society…applying to the daily life, and to its many as-
sociations” (Rawls 2005: 12–3).36 To have a set of distributive principles 
that apply to the individual actions outside the institutional realm is 
anathema for liberal Rawlsians, which could interpret the require-
ments as demanding too much from the individuals.
In order to respond to this potential criticism, I have two main 
strategies. One, admittedly contentious strategy, is to show that Rawls’ 
own account of political liberalism is too burdensome towards residents 
of well-ordered societies and towards individuals who under a slightly 
less stringent operationalization of the idea of reasonableness would be 
included in the legitimation pool.37 The second is to sketch a theory of 
global suffi cientarianism that is, in my opinion, a better candidate for 
a monist theory of distributive justice than any form of egalitarianism.
In his Law of peoples, Rawls argues that “a main task […] is to 
specify how far liberal peoples are to tolerate nonliberal peoples. To 
tolerate means to recognize these societies as equal participating mem-
bers in good standing of the society of peoples, with certain rights and 
obligations, including the duty of civility, requiring that they offer oth-
er peoples public reasons appropriate to the society of peoples for their 
actions” (Rawls 1999: 59). Notice here an important distinction from 
Political liberalism, where the moral duty of civility is considered to 
be the capacity of reasonable citizens to appeal to the ideal of public 
reason when engaging in activities which could alter constitutional es-
that “reasonable pluralism of [reasonable] comprehensive doctrines is not an 
unfortunate condition of human life” (2005: 37), whereas Murphy’s interpretation of 
overdemandigness coincides with principles that ask of some individuals to give up 
on the life of their choice in order to fulfi ll a (maximizing) theory’s ends. I will assume 
throughout that there is a moral loss only if those life conceptions are themselves 
reasonable.
35 The passage that Cohen has in mind belongs to Nagel: “Most people are not 
generous when asked to give voluntarily, and it is unreasonable to ask that they 
should be…It is acceptable to compel people to contribute to the support of the 
indigent by automatic taxation, but unreasonable to insist that in the absence of 
such a system they ought to contribute voluntarily” (Nagel 1975: 145).
36 On the possibility of an overlapping consensus on a set of monist principles see 
Murphy (1998: 255–6).
37 I’ve taken the notion of “legitimation pool” from Friedman (2003).
 A. C. Dumitru, On the Moral Irrelevance of a Global Basic Structure 255
sentials and matters of basic justice (Rawls 2005: 215–7).38 Simplify-
ing, matters such as who has the rights to vote, who benefi ts from fair 
equality of opportunity or what are the basic needs that ought to be 
met by the government (Rawls 2005: 214),39 have to be settled by re-
sorting to arguments from a political conception of justice, which is the 
matter of an overlapping consensus. That political conception consti-
tutes “a common currency of discussion”, where citizens tap in for any 
arguments they put forward (Rawls 2005: 165). Later, Rawls relaxes 
this latter condition, and allows arguments to come from reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, “provided that in due course proper politi-
cal reasons are presented that are suffi cient to support whatever the 
comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support” (Rawls 1997: 
784). According to Habermas, this Rawlsian proviso imposes heavy cog-
nitive burdens on both reasonable non-religious citizens, who have to 
take into account the inputs into the public debate of religious citizens, 
and on reasonable religious citizens, who have to embrace the neces-
sity of translating their arguments from comprehensive into political 
ones and to do this without “jeopardizing their own doctrine’s exclusive 
claim to truth” (Habermas 2008 [2005]: 137–144). This is one sense in 
which Rawls’ own theory would seem too demanding for the citizens of 
well-ordered societies, who have to conduct their behavior in certain 
circumstances according to a duty of civility from which citizens of de-
cent hierarchical societies are exempted.
One could add to this the problem of a certain skewness in the con-
cept of reasonability towards those citizens who already embrace the 
legitimacy of political organization (Simmons 2001: 151).40 Indeed, 
Rawls offers several possibilities to contest the outputs of public de-
bate: civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, witnessing. Rawls men-
tions that witnessing is a special case of contestation in which, citizens 
who usually endorse a reasonable political conception of justice, op-
pose a decision because of their comprehensive doctrines: “while they 
may think the outcome of a vote on which all reasonable citizens have 
conscientiously followed public reason to be incorrect, they neverthe-
less recognize it as legitimate law and accept the obligation not to vio-
late it” (Rawls 1997: 787). By linking reasonableness to the acceptance 
of fair terms of cooperation among citizens of a closed society, Rawls 
“builds too much moral content” in the fi rst concept (Simmons 2001: 
151). Closer to the arguments put forward in this paper, one could ar-
38 This idea is more clearly stated in Rawls (1997: 768–9).
39 See Rawls (2001: 44), for the specifi cation of a principle “requiring that basic 
needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is a necessary condition for citizens 
to understand and to be able fruitfully to exercise their basic rights and liberties”, 
and which is lexically prior to the fi rst principle.
40 “This conception of reasonableness should trouble us. It is not obviously 
unreasonable to prefer solitude and independence to cooperation. It is surely not 
unreasonable to prefer more limited or less coercive small scales of cooperation to 
states” (Simmons 2001: 151).
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gue that Rawls puts too little moral content in reasonableness. Let’s 
assume that Gordon is a cosmopolitan, but also considers interesting 
Rawls’ ideas of accepting fair terms of cooperation with others and the 
burdens of judgment (an understanding of reasonableness that extends 
the scope to which the terms of cooperation apply). His position, never-
theless, would be excluded from public argumentation, since it would 
be considered unreasonable for denying that “political society should 
be a fair system of social cooperation for mutual benefi t” (Quong 2004: 
315). In order for his cognitive input to matter, Gordon would have to 
renounce at his cosmopolitan ideals. Had he been a member of a de-
cent hierarchical society, he would not have been subject to such rigid 
norms, though his rights would have not been that secure.41 This is a 
second sense in which Rawls’ own conception is overdemanding, in that 
it restricts the scope of conceptions of the good that would be reason-
able under a not so narrow understanding of the concept.
One could wonder what is the connection between Rawls’ legitimacy 
account and my overall concern with distributive justice. What unifi es 
these two seemingly separate discussions is the overarching criterion 
of the possibility to lead the life of one’s choice. According to such an 
evaluative dimension, we can judge both how Rawls’ arguments drawn 
from his political liberalism fare and how my own distributive justice 
sketch of a theory fares. Following Sen, we could say that this overarch-
ing criterion corresponds to a prior principle strategy of argumentation 
(Sen 1979). Valentini (2012) who argues that both liberal conceptions 
of justice and accounts of legitimacy share the same fundamental com-
mitment to equal respect and as such can be analyzed together, has 
endorsed a similar strategy.42
I acknowledge the fact that at least one version of monist distribu-
tive principles would take a form that would contradict the criterion 
of moral accessibility. Murphy’s endorsement of egalitarianism as a 
“supergoal” that is to be achieved through personal and institutional 
efforts has been criticized by Pogge on the grounds that it would ignore 
agent-relative goals. Full equality being an insatiable (Raz 1986: 235–
244) ideal, “even under the best conceivable circumstances, a citizen is 
morally free to attend to what is important to herself if and only inso-
far as doing so happens to coincide with her pursuit for the supergoal” 
(Pogge 2000: 161). I agree that pursuing egalitarianism would be too 
demanding for individuals, leaving no room not only for agent-relative 
41 Space limitations do not allow me to discuss this aspect here. Some arguments 
for my contention can be found in Buchanan (2006) and Macleod (2006).
42 “Either a set of institutions instantiates equal respect because its rule meets 
independent distributive standard, or it instantiates equal respect because its rule 
is democratically validated” (Valentini 2012: 597). This is an important theoretical 
claim, because Rawls has adamantly distinguished his account of legitimacy from 
his conception of justice. See Rawls (2005: 241) for how following the precepts of 
public reason might lead to results contrary to those preferred by a conception of 
justice.
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goals, as Pogge says (since these could still be ensured through im-
posing some deontological constraints), but also for personal projects. 
Cohen’s conception, especially, with his criticism of Rawls’ focus on in-
centives, presents such a risk that would surely diminish the appeal of 
a conception of justice (Cohen 1991). On the other hand, less demand-
ing principles of justice could be compatible with a monism conception. 
Though he does not endorse such a view, Pogge himself mentions that 
“monism could be more plausible if specifi ed through a less ambitious 
goal, like the goal that all human beings have access to freedom and 
resources above some minimal threshold. Moreover, such goals, once 
reasonably well achieved, would not have the totalitarian implications 
of more ambitious supergoals and would not make crushing demands 
on culture and lifestyle, while leaving plenty of room for the pursuit 
of agent-centered goals. Under such a supergoal, it would also keep 
infrequent the occasions on which persons are required to violate just 
institutions” (Pogge 2000: 163).
The particular version of suffi cientarianism that I have in mind is 
meant to alleviate the concerns that a interactional-institutional hy-
brid conception of global cosmopolitan justice would be overdemanding. 
Satisfi cing suffi cientarianism appeals to two distinct kind of justifi ca-
tion: 1) that it is rational for individuals to pursue good enough ends, 
and not optimality;43 2) that the moral imperatives do not require one 
to do more than enough, i.e. that it would be admirable, but supererog-
atory to perform actions above a certain threshold of value (Brink 2006: 
384). The fi rst corresponds to non-ideal theoretical considerations, 
while the latter to ideal theory.
More than half a century ago, Simon noticed that the classical view 
on the rationality of the “economic man” had little to do with reality. 
The classical view held that the economic man benefi ted from extensive 
information regarding the context of choice, a well-organized and sys-
tem preference order, and “a skill in computation that enables him to 
calculate, or the alternative courses of action that are available to him, 
which of these will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on 
his preference scale (Simon 1978: 9). Simon argued that this account 
of substantive rationality was incomplete, and that we should look at 
procedural rationality, i.e. the “effectiveness, in light of human cogni-
tive powers and limitations, of the procedures used to choose actions” 
(Simon 1978: 9). Real human beings do not search for all alternatives, 
they make cognitive errors, the informational inputs to the decision 
processes are incomplete and many times they select an alternative 
that is satisfactory, not optimal (Simon 1985: 295). As such, they are 
boundedly rational and pursue strategies of satisfi cing. Satisfi cing, 
as opposed to maximizing behavior, is not concerned with getting the 
most utility out of a situation, but with deriving a certain amount of 
43 See also Volacu (2017) for a discussion on consequentialist satisfi cing, bounded 
rationality and suffi cientarianism.
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utility: “In a satisfi cing model, search terminates when the best offer 
exceeds an aspiration level that itself adjusts gradually to the value 
of the offers received so far” (Simon 1978, 10). However, in order to 
understand the distinction between a maximizer and a satisfi cer, one 
has to understand why one stops the search. That is, maximizing and 
satisfi cing have different stopping rules: a maximizer stops because the 
costs of continuing the search exceed the expected benefi ts, whereas a 
satisfi cer stops because the option he settles with is good enough for 
her (Schmidtz 1992: 446–7).
Michael Slote has adopted the notion of satisfi cing and employed 
it in the model of consequentialist ethics. According to Slote, an act 
is morally right if it has good enough consequences (Slote 1984: 140). 
Slote holds that the idea of satisfi cing consequentialism is anticipated 
by Popper’s negative utilitarianism, where Popper emphasizes that 
“we have a moral duty to minimize suffering and evil, but no general 
duty to maximize human happiness” (Slote 1984: 152).
Suffi cientarian theories hold that what distributive justice requires 
is that individuals have enough of some currency or metric.44 Accord-
ing to Casal (2007: 297–8) the suffi ciency view comprises two theses: a 
positive one, emphasizing the moral importance of people living above 
a threshold, and a negative thesis, denying the relevance of additional 
distributive requirements. The suffi ciency view has been proposed ini-
tially as a counterpart to economic egalitarianism by Harry Frankfurt 
(1987). In Frankfurt’s view, the point of morality is that “each should 
have enough... If everyone had enough, it would be of no moral con-
sequence whether some had more than others” (1987: 21). However, 
Shields (2012) has recently argued that suffi cientarianism could also be 
specifi ed as a distributive pattern that “shifts” the urgency of respond-
ing to individuals’ claims after a certain threshold has been reached.
In this paper, I make the limited claim that the principles that 
ought to apply at a global level have to belong to the suffi cientarian 
family. I propose the satisfi cing suffi cientarian version as a plausible 
example of how we could think about cosmopolitan justice, but there 
are many other conceptions that embody the moral value of suffi ciency 
(Benbaji 2005; Benbaji 2006; Huseby 2010; Shields 2012).
Two-threshold satisfi cing suffi cientarianism: It is morally required 
to reduce the number of people who are below a minimal threshold. 
Thus, absolute priority is to be given to those below the minimal thresh-
old. The following disclaimer applies: absolute priority is to be given 
through institutional action. When it comes to individual action, ab-
solute priority is to be given only if the agents who make the allocation 
are above the maximal threshold. This is the input from satisfi cing con-
sequentialism. Between thresholds, strong prioritarian considerations 
apply: if there are suffi ciently numerous people, benefi ting them is more 
important than raising an inferior number of people over the superior 
44 The term “currency” has fi rst been used by G.A. Cohen (1989).
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threshold. This holds only if there is reasonable expectation that they 
can in the future be raised over the threshold, taking into account the 
scarcity of resources and a just savings principle which stipulates that 
future generations ought to have the opportunity to be above the mini-
mal threshold. Above the superior threshold, the view remains silent. 
Throughout, Pareto optimality considerations apply, with two excep-
tions: the absolute priority given to those below the threshold, which 
trumps trivial losses of those betwen thresholds and considerable losses 
of those above the maximal threshold; second, a suffi ciently large num-
ber of people with the prospect of being raised over the maximal thresh-
old trumps a trivial loss of those above the maximal threshold, and, if 
the number is suffi ciently high, considerable losses. I understand the 
Pareto principle here in a weak sense: a distribution is weakly Pareto 
superior to another if there is at least one individual better and no in-
dividual worse off in the former than in the latter. Since good and bad 
off are given by individuals’ positioning in respect to the thresholds, this 
prevents at all times the possibility of one individual falling below a suf-
fi ciency threshold. Applied to individuals, the exceptions hold only when 
it comes to trivial losses—that is, we ought to discharge our imperfect, 
individual duties of justice only if we do not incur considerable costs—
this comes once again from the satisfi cing consequentialism view.
This version of suffi cientarianism will ensure that our positive du-
ties towards other individuals are discharged differently when it comes 
to individual and institutional action. The conception remains monist, 
in that it specifi es the same principles both for individual interactions 
and for institutional actions. However, it incorporates the concerns for 
the overdemandingness objection, and it accounts for the fact that as 
individual agents we can have only imperfect obligations of justice (re-
fl ecting Ypi’s and Miklos’ emphasis on agency-related problems at the 
level of non-ideal theory). I believe that such a suffi ciency view can 
allow individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good without 
sacrifi cing for this the necessity of fulfi lling the obligations of justice. 
As mentioned above, the view is justifi ed at a normative level by Slote’s 
satisfi cing consequentialism and at a positive level by perceiving indi-
viduals as rational satisfi cers. As it is, the conception highlights the 
fact that whether or not a basic structure exists is irrelevant from the 
standpoint of justice- obligations to raise worse off individuals over a 
threshold of a preferred currency remain even in the absence of an 
institutional framework. Institutions should be seen as playing an 
instrumental-constitutive part in a conception of justice, and not as 
necessary conditions for considerations of justice to arise.45
45 There remains to be seen how my proposal fares in comparison with other 
accounts of suffi cientarian global justice. I cannot pursue this comparison here, but I 
can point the reader to the (limited) number of writings that employ suffi cientarian 
distributive principles at the global level: Satz (2010), Kuo (2014), Miller (2009), 
Laborde (2010).
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Conclusions
I have argued in this paper that the basic structure is morally irrel-
evant, i.e. that it does not ground considerations of justice. In the fi rst 
section I argued that a case can be made that under each fi ve com-
peting operationalizations (coercion, framing, cooperation, pervasive 
impact and controlling infl uence) the basic structure is global. In the 
second section I endorsed the Rawlsian natural duty to establish just 
institutions, in order to show that, even if there is no global justice, this 
does not entail that we do not have duties of justice towards residents 
of other countries. In the third section I argued for extending the site 
of justice to individual conduct outside of the institutional realm, while 
in the fourth section I tried to show that the view I put forward is not 
overdemanding. The institutional-interactional hybrid of global cosmo-
politan justice that I propose ought to have as a distributive principle 
a member of the suffi cientarian family. In this paper I argued for a 
particular version of suffi cientarianism, satisfi cing suffi cientarianism, 
which embodies a monist conception of justice, but which is discharged 
differently: 1) by specifying imperfect duties at the level of individual 
conduct and 2) by establishing perfect duties at the level of the institu-
tional framework. I have also argued that institutional crafting should 
be done following two distinct desiderata: 1) fulfi lling the ends of our 
preferred theory of justice; 2) allowing individuals to pursue their own 
reasonable conception of the good within that institutional framework.
Some additional concerns remain. By asking individuals to respect 
the principles of suffi cientarian justice, am I not imposing a certain 
conception of the good? That is, my view could favor only those indi-
viduals who already employ a particular conception of the good, which 
would be a form of satisfi cing consequentialism.46 My response would 
be that this risk is diminished by the fact that both the distributive rule 
(suffi cientarian) and the ethical conception justifying it (satisfi cing con-
sequentialism) impose just minimal standards, and could easily be sup-
plemented. Remember that satisfi cing consequentialism considers any 
action which goes beyond its minimal specifi cations to be supereroga-
tory. As such, individuals who hold more demanding ethical concep-
tions, such as maximizing consequentialism, or various forms of virtue 
ethics, could easily satisfy the minimal requirements imposed by satis-
fi cing suffi cientarianism. By focusing on comprehensive outcomes, the 
view is also compatible with deontological constraints. Thus, following 
Rawls, satisfi cing consequentialism could be perceived as a “module, 
an essential constituent part that fi ts into and can be supported by 
various reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls 2005: 12). Neither 
does my view exhaust the realm of morality—under certain circum-
stances, we must intervene according to (suffi cientarian) principles of 
justice. Nevertheless, duties of assistance or morality continue to exist 
outside this more limited framework.
46 I thank Emil Archambault for this provocative question.
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One last caveat is that I have only sketched the satisfi cing suffi cien-
tarian theory of global cosmopolitan justice. Much more needs to be 
done in order to have a proper theory of justice. One of the most impor-
tant challenges will be to specify the currency of justice, a problem ag-
gravated by the existence of two thresholds. For the moment, I can only 
point the reader to the vast literature on the problem of a threshold 
in the literature on suffi cientarianism (Arneson 2000; Arneson 2006; 
Widerquist 2010; Casal 2007). Once again, my case against the basic 
structure argument ought to be distinguished from my arguments for 
an institutional-interactional hybrid theory of global justice and also 
from my arguments for a satisfi cing suffi cientarian distributive prin-
ciple. One could accept one, two or all three parts, but rejecting one of 
them does not automatically lead to the repudiation of the others.
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